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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE
NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON *
Statutory construction is probably not the most exciting job in the pro-
fessional life of a Supreme Court justice, but it is certainly one of the most
time consuming and arduous. Consequently a picture of the judicial work of
Mr. Justice Rutledge would hardly be complete if it did not attempt to give
some hint of his labors in the rich but thorny field of statutory interpretation.
In the course of those labors Mr. Justice Rutledge theorized little about the
relative responsibilities of judges, administrators and legislators in a demo-
cratic society. He was not so apt, as some of his more eloquent colleagues, to
excoriate his brethren for usurpation or abdication of judicial authority
whenever he disagreed with them on the exact meaning to be attributed to
ambiguous statutory language. His philosophy of statutory interpretation,
if he had one, must be deduced from the way he practiced it.
I
M\uch of this practice, both in the opinions which Mr. Justice Rutledge
wrote and in the decisions in which he participated, is to be found in the
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Indeed one of the earliest of
the Justice's outstanding opinions was the dissent he wrote for himself and
Justices Black, 'Murphy, and in part, Douglas, in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products. Inc., concerning the validity of the Administrator's definition of
"area of production" for the purpose of the exemption of employees " 'within
the area of production (as defined by the Administrator) engaged in . . .
canning of agricultural . . . commodities for market .... ' "2 The definition
in question included as one of its components the number of employees en-
gaged in the particular establishment; the Court held the inclusion of this fac-
tor to be beyond the scope of the authority conferred upon the Administrator.
The majority opinion, by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, conceded that the statute
delegated a considerable measure of discretion to the "experienced and in-
formed judgment of the Administrator" to be exercised in the formulation
of the definition of "area of production," but concluded that a definition
formulated in terms of sizes of establishments was "beyond the plain geo-
graphic implications of that phrase." Whether other parts of the definition,
especially those couched in terms of the population of the city or town within
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B., Yale, 1929,
LL.B., 1932; S.J.D., Harvard, 1933. Law Clerk, Circuit Judge Julian W. Mack, 1933-34.
Law Clerk, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 1933-35. Attorney for SEC, 1935-1936. Associate
General Counsel, OPA, 1942-1945.
1. 322 U. S. 607, 625 (1944).
2. Id. at 608.
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which the plant was located, were also beyond the plain geographic implications
of the phrase, the Court was not called upon to determine in the particular case.
It may be guessed that Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have had less difficulty
with this latter aspect of the definition, since he found some indication in the
legislative history that one of the sponsors of the exemption "had in mind not
differences between establishments within the same territory but between
rural communities and urban centers. . .. " Thus Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concluded that legislative history supported the natural meaning of the words
and suggested that ". . . Congress might well have considered that a large
plant within an area should not be given an advantage over small plants in
competing for labor within the same locality, while at the same time it gave
the Administrator ample power, in defining the area, to take due account of
the appropriate economic factors in drawing the geographic lines."4
To Mr. Justice Rutledge this line of argument was compounding mere
verbalism with a misreading of legislative history. To support the first criti-
cism he appealed to the generalities of an earlier opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter himself :
The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning
is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification. . . . A statute,
like other living organisms, derives significance from its environ-
ment, from which it cannot be severed without being mutilated.'
In this light the phrase "area of production" was not merely the sum of three
simple words but was rather a term of art whose meaning could be derived
only by projecting it against the basic policies of the statute. The most per-
tinent of these for Mr. Justice Rutledge was the "broad line between farming
and industry"-"the statute's basic line of policy between coverage and non-
coverage."'" The processing activities mentioned in the exemption were close
to the borderline-to some extent in small establishments which were closely
related to the economic life of a farm community, and to some extent in large
processing plants which were typical of an industrial community. To make
his definition correspond as closely as possible to such realities it was only
natural and sensible for the Administrator to take into account the size of
the particular establishment.
With reference to the legislative history, Mr. Justice Rutledge was largely
concerned with showing that little weight could be given to isolated remarks
of individual sponsors of the various proposals which culminated in the "area-
of-production" exemption. In support of this, he pointed out that "there was
3. Id. at 615.
4. Id. at 615-616.
5. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia, 317
U. S. 424, 431-432 (1943).
6. Addison v. Holly Hills Fruit Products Co., 322 U. S. 607, 630-631 (1944) (dis-
senting opinion).
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great complexity and variety of opinion" and that "this revolved around the
question of size"; that the "question continued unresolved up to conference
and was resolved there, not by decision either way, but by reference to the
Administrator. ' 7 Mr. Justice Rutledge may have been guilty of pressing
his argument too far in maintaining that the legislative history not only
was ". . . not inconsistent with what the Administrator has done, but on the
contrary supports it." He was, however, on very realistic ground in sug-
gesting that Congress after struggling with the problem, finally threw up
its hands in effect and said: "Let the Administrator work it out."9
The controversy in the Addison case did not peacefully subside immedi-
ately after the decision of the Court. The Administrator dutifully redefined
"area of production" without reference to the number of employees in a par-
ticular establishment. But he also emphasized in his explanatory opinion that
the definition was highly unsatisfactory because some large industrial plants
within the "area of production" would be free from minimum wage control
while competitors serving the same market would not be.' 0 The Administrator
conceded that so long as the minimum wage was only 40 cents an hour, this
competitive advantage was more theoretical than real, since the wage level
was generally above the statutory minimum. But when the amendments of
1949, embodying a substantial increase in the minimum wage level, were
7. Id. at 635.
8. Ibid.
9. There was another aspect of the Addison case with more general "administrative
law" implications. Having found the Administrator's definition invalid, the majority
was still faced with the problem of what to do with the case. The lower court had in
effect remade the definition by striking out the part dealing with size of plants and
applying the rest so as to give the defendant the benefit of the exemption. This solution
the majority rejected on the ground that it was a usurpation of the administrative
function; instead the trial court was directed to retain jurisdiction until the Administrator
had had an opportunity to formulate a new definition, and then to dispose of the case on
the basis of that definition. To this solution Mr. Justice Rutledge, for himself and
Justices Black and Murphy, also objected on the ground that it would give retroactive
effect to the Administrator's definition; he argued that if the definition was invalid
the entire exemption would be inapplicable and the defendant would be clearly subject
to the statute until a new definition was formulated. The logical implications of that
position would seem to be that the validity of the definition was irrelevant to the out-
come of the particular case and therefore the defendant should not have been entitled
to raise the questions at all-thus making the validity of the definition practically
unreviewable. These implications seem to militate against the soundness of Mr. Justice
Rutledge's solution; but there were also, as he pointed out, serious difficulties with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's solution. While it may not have seemed particularly shocking to
grant a retroactive exemption, retroactive application of the new definition would have
been much more unpalatable in a situation where it subjected to the Act an employer
who had previously been exempt. Congress avoided this embarrassment in the subsequent
amendments embodied in the Portal-to-Portal Act by providing that good faith compliance
with the Administrator's previous regulation would be a good defense. Pub. L. No. 49,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 14, 1947). Conceivably the courts might have reached the
same conclusion without the help of such a statutory provision.
10. Findings of the Administrator, U. S. Department of Labor Release, D-147
(Dec. 18, 1946).
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under consideration the problem became no longer academic. The Senate
Committee proposed to solve it by accepting the Administrator's suggestion
that the "area-of-production" exemption be eliminated entirely with respect
to minimum wages but left in effect so far as maximum hours were con-
cerned."' This proposal was eventually rejected however, and the "area-of-
production" exemption remained unchanged.12 Superficially this might seem
to be vindication for the majority in the Addispon case. More likely it was
simply the answer of a different Congress to another proposed solution-a
solution which the Court itself had been clearly powerless to adopt.
Whether it would also have been a usurpation of power for the Court to
adopt the view advocated by the dissent in the Addison case is another ques-
tion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested that it would when he said:
Construction is not legislation and must avoid 'that retrospective
expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial
legislation.' To blur the distinctive functions of the legislative
and judicial processes is not conducive to responsible legislation. 3
The difficulty in applying this precept is that the interpretation with which
you disagree so often looks like judicial legislation. In the particular case,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter really found his touchstone of interpretation in
the principle that
• . . legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed
to the common run of men and is therefore to be understood ac-
cording to the sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right
to rely on ordinary words addressed to him.' 4
But the core of Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent and its essential soundness lay
in the proposition that these were not ordinary words nor were they addressed
to the ordinary man; they were words of art addressed to the Administrator.
No employer or employee could be expected to tell from reading the statute
whether he was within the "area of production"; it was the administrative
definition which was supposed to tell him. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's precept,
which may be a very good one when applied to self-executing statutory
provisions, seems singularly inappropriate when applied to a delegation of
authority to make more specific an admittedly ambiguous statutory phrase.
It may be suggested, of course, that the phrase must nevertheless be
interpreted so as to put some limits on administrative authority. Though
this is true, it is not unusual for language conferring authority in some
particular phase of administration to receive its limitations from the statutory
11. SEN. REP. No. 640, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949).
12. CONFERENCE REP. No. 1453 (1949) ; Pub. L. No. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 11
(Oct. 26, 1949).
13. Addison v. Holly Hills Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607, 618 (1944).
14. Ibid.
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framework as a whole. -Indeed Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion did not
suggest that the phrase as interpreted by Mr. Justice Rutledge would be
invalid as too broad a delegation. Instead he argued that the Fair Labor
Standards Act, unlike some other statutes, was specific in enumerating
the exemptions Congress intended. This argument ignored the significance
of the fact that the "area-of-production" exemption, unlike the other ex-
emptions in the statute, contained a delegation of authority, itself an in-
dication that the legislators appreciated that they had used language of a
different order from that employed in the other exemptions. But, this dis-
cussion of generalities is not offered as a conclusive answer to the problem
of statutory interpretation, presented in the Addison case; eventually a
point is reached where a question of judgment outruns analysis.
The same may be said of another issue under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, presented in Gemsco, Inc. v. I'Valling,15 where fr. Justice Rutledge
wrote for the Court, with Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts dis-
senting. The question was whether an administrative prohibition of home-
work was sanctioned by the statutory provision authorizing wage orders
to "'. . . contain such terms and conditions as the Administrator finds
necessary to carry out the purpose of such orders, to prevent circumvention
or evasion thereof, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates established
therein.' " Mr. Justice Rutledge found such justification both in the com-
mon sense of the statute-the necessity for such administrative power in order
to prevent the defeat of statutory objectives-and the literal language of the
provision. Mr. Justice Frankfurter added a word to emphasize that his con-
currence was based primarily on the latter. But Ir. Justice Roberts was able
to show that there was at least room for argument, if the level of discourse
was confined to statutory language. The administrative authority was
conferred only with respect to minimum wages set by administrative order
as distinguished from stattitory minimums; terms and conditions should
therefore relate to the practicability of particular wage rates rather than to
so fundamental a question as the suppression of part of an industry because
that part made enforcement of any minimum wage rate impracticable.
Furthermore, said Mr. Justice Roberts, legislative history indicated deletion
of a provision authorizing the suppression of industrial homework: thus
the Court was writing in what Congress had deliberately rejected.
Once again the case was not as simple as either side would make it appear.
Legislative history was ambiguous, since it could not be said with assurance
whether the particular authorization was withdrawn because it was deemed
unwise to single out specific examples, or because it was considered undesir-
able to grant such authority. So far as the resulting statutory language is
15. 324 U. S. 244 (1945).
16. Id. at 248.
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concerned, it seems clear that the Conference Committee, in putting together
the two basically different approaches embodied in the Senate and House
bills, failed to iron out all the inconsistencies. The Senate bill relied primarily
on administrative orders to establish the minimum wage levels: the House
bill relied upon graduated statutory minimums. The Conference Committee
proposed a combination of basic statutory minimums and administrative
variations but included the original Senate provision with respect to the
Administrator's powers to include terms and conditions necessary to prevent
circumvention and evasion of his orders-a provision admirably suited to
the Senate bill, but something less than perfectly adapted to the compromise
version. Mr. Justice Rutledge did not undertake to resolve this inconsistency,
finding it sufficient for the particular case to sustain the prohibition of indus-
trial homework as an adjunct of an administrative wage order. Subse-
quently, Congress resolved the rest of the problem, so far as industrial
homework was concerned, by authorizing the Administrator "to make such
regulations and orders regulating, restricting, or prohibiting industrial home-
work as are necessary or appropriate to prevent circumvention or evasion
of and to safeguard the minimum wage rate prescribed in this Act" and
continuing in force existing regulations on the subject.1 7
The clash between literal and creative reading of the Fair Labor Standards
Act was more sharply drawn in Levinson v. Spector Motor Ser-,ice,8 which
concerned the exemption from the overtime provisions of ". . . any employee
with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to
establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to section 204
of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935. .. "19 The Court held that this provision
was to be applied according to its terms, exempting even those employees the
greater part of whose work had nothing to do with safety of motor carrier
operations so long as the Commission had made a valid determination of its
power with respect to such employees and irrespective of whether or not the
power had been exercised. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting for himself and
Justices Black and Murphy, supported the Administrator's position that the
exemption should be ". . . inapplicable to any employee 'who spends the
greater part of his time during any workweek on non-exempt activities (such
as producing, processing, or manufacturing goods, warehouse or clerical work,
or other type of work which does not affect safety of operations).' ",2' This
solution, the Justice said, was in accord with the apparent legislative intent,
since the legislative history indicated that the exemption was originally adopted
17. Pub. L. No. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., § 9(d) (Oct. 26, 1949).
18. 330 U. S. 649 (1947).
19. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (1940).
20. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, 692 (1947). For further
developments of the rule of the Levinson case compare Morris v. McComb, 332 U. S.
422, 440 (1947), from which Mr. Justice Rutledge also dissented.
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to free the drivers of motor carriers from regulation of hours by two agencies,
upon the understanding that the Commission had already acted to establish
maximum hour regulation for such employees. It was also consistent with
the objectives of both statutes, since it left the Commission free to extend its
regulations to any employees whose work substantially affected safety of
operations, but prevented an employer from evading the maximum hour
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act by assigning to some of his
employees just enough of such work to get the benefit of the exemption,
without really spurring the Commission to take action. The difficulty with
this solution was that it was made up practically of whole cloth. It created
one area in which the statutes were to be mutually exclusive and another
area in which they were not, although the exemption spoke clearly in terms
of exclusive Commission power wherever that power was applicable. This
would have been really vulnerable to the charge of judicial legislation.
Mr. Justice Rutledge missed some of the fun or heartache involved in
working out the basic overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
since the Belo21 case was decided before he took his seat. He did, however,
participate in its reconsideration in Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co.,22 where he indicated that if the matter were one of first impression he
would agree with the dissenting Justices, Murphy and Douglas, that a guaran-
teed weekly wage, which superseded hourly rates if a certain number of hours
were not worked, could not be divorced from the statutory "regular rate" of
pay, but where he voted with the majority because ". . . the Belo case has been
relied upon by the parties to this cause and no doubt also by others, in making
their arrangements; and the facts here seem to me indistinguishable from
those covered by the Belo decision." 23 In the other leading overtime cases
before the 1947 and 1949 amendments of the Act, Mr. Justice Rutledge
joined with the majority in denying that previous custom or collective bar-
gaining agreements, even though negotiated in good faith between employers
and powerful independent unions, should be determinative of what should be
regarded as working time, or overtime within the meaning of the statute.2 4 In
all of the overtime cases the essential ambiguity of the statutory language
made some judicial interpolation inevitable; the questions of judgment con-
cerned the extent to which the basic policy of the statute, to discourage over-
time or to assure extra pay for it, should be qualified by competing policies
embodied in other statutes encouraging collective bargaining or by recognition
21. -Walling v. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624 (1942).
22. 331 U. S. 17 (1947).
23. Id. at 26 (concurring opinion).
24. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U. S. 446 (1948); Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680 (1946) ; Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167,
United Mine Workers of America, 325 U. S. 161 (1945) ; Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U. S. 590 (1944).
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of established industrial practices. In the 1947 and 1949 amendments Congress
did, it is true, write such qualifications into the statute, but that is a far cry
from saying that they were contemplated by the Congress which enacted the
original statute or were necessarily implied by the original language. Indeed
the very language of the subsequent amendments 25 indicates how complex
the problems were and how difficult it would have been to solve them solely
by the process of judicial interpretation, as distinguished from more explicit
legislative criteria or the exercise of delegated administrative authority.
It is apparent from a glance at the voting recbrd in the Wage and Hour
cases that Mr. Justice Rutledge consistently supported the employees' claims
in the cases which came before the Court,2 departing from this position only
when he felt it would be unfair to change a rule which employers had justifi-
ably relied upon. There may be some temptation to ascribe this record to
"sentimentality" or a partiality to labor's claims.17 But we must remember that
the cases which reach the Supreme Court are themselves the result of a win-
nowing process which eliminates the easy ones; in those that survive there is
usually much to be said on both sides. And what the adverse critic might be in-
clined to call partiality for labor, the admirer might just as reasonably ascribe to
respect for the primary statutory objectives. That this was the way the
Justice himself understood his 'guide lines is made clear by his observation
in the Levinson case:
The latter statute [The Fair Labor Standards Act], it has been
held repeatedly, is to be broadly and liberally applied, in order to
achieve its prime objects of distributing and raising standards of
employment and living. The Act however contains certain exempt-
ing provisions, which are to be narrowly construed in the light of
and in order to accomplish the same statutory purposes. 28
II
Most comparable to the Wage and Hour cases were the questions of
statutory interpretation with which Mr. Justice Rutledge had to wrestle in
applying the National Labor Relations Act and other statutes protecting the
25. See note 9 supra; Pub. L. No. 49, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2, 3 (May 14, 1947);
Pub. L. No. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., § 7 (Oct. 26, 1949).
26. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U. S. 377 (1948) ; Borden Co. v. Borella,
325 U. S. 679 (1945) ; 10 E. 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus, 325 U. S. 578 (1945) ;
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 (1945) ; Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490 (1945) ; McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491 (1943). One
of the most significant but less controversial opinions of Mr. Justice Rutledge was his
opinion for the Court in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186(1946), delineating the investigatory powers of the Administrator under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and also clarifying the general question of judicial enforcement of
administrative subpoenas.
27. See Freund, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREmE CouRT 50, 66 (1949).
28. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, 686 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
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rights of labor. One of his most noteworthy opinions for the Court was
delivered in National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications Inc.,
2 9
sustaining the Board's finding that newsboys were "employees" within the
meaning of the Act. In reaching this conclusion the justice rejected the
contention that the meaning of the term "employee" was to be derived in
accordance with the conventional distinction between servants and independent
contractors, as developed for the purpose of determining vicarious liability
in tort, or for applying Workmen's Compensation statutes. The principal
reasons for this rejection he summarized in the following passage:
Enmeshed in such distinctions, the administration of the statute
soon might become encumbered by the same sort of technical legal
refinement as has characterized the long evolution of the employee-
independent contractor dichotomy in the courts for other purposes.
The consequences would be ultimately to defeat, in part at least,
the achievement of the statute's objectives."
As a substitute for such a technical definition, Mr. Justice Rutledge in effect
interpreted the term "employee" as a delegation of authority to the Board to
define its meaning by individual applications to particular situations-ap-
plications guided primarily by the statutory objectives, and controlled by
sufficient judicial review to guard against arbitrary abuse of authority. This
is essentially the same kind of delegation as was involved in the Addison case,
although one was to be exercised by determinations of individual cases and
the other by general regulation.31 Indeed Mr. Justice Rutledge's method of
statutory interpretation in the Hearst case is basically identical with his
method in the Addison case, although in one he spoke for the majority of the
Court, and in the other for the dissenters.12
A more complex and subtle question of collective bargaining, this time
under the Railway Labor Act, was presented in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern
Railway Co. v. Burley,33 in which Mr. Justice Rutledge again wrote for the
Court, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered a dissenting opinion for him-
self, Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Roberts and Jackson. The basic
question of statutory interpretation involved was whether a union, by virtue
of being the exclusive statutory collective bargaining agent of certain em-
29. 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
30. Id. at 125.
31. See Nathanson, Adminhistrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3
VANDERBILT L. REV. 470 (1950).
32. For cases involving similar problems of interpretation in which Mr. Justice
Rutledge participated but did not write the opinion of the Court see Rutherford Food
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U. S. 722 (1947) ("employee" under the Fair Labor Standards
Act) ; United States v. Silk, 331 U. S. 704 (1947) ("employees" under the Social Security
Act); National Labor Relations Board v. Atkins & Co., 331 U. S. 398 (1947) (plant
guards as "employees" under National Labor Relations Act) ; Packard Motor Car Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 485 (1947) (foremen as "employees" under
the National Labor Relations Act).
33. 325 U. S. 711 (1945).
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ployees, was also authorized to represent them in the prosecution and
settlement of claims for violation of an existing collective agreement. (It
would be impossible to recite all the applicable statutory provisions without
setting forth a very substantial portion of the Railway Labor Act; for the
answer did not turn on the meaning of a few isolated words, but rather
on the interrelationship between several different sections of the statute.)
It was quite clear that, with respect to negotiation of collective agree-
ments, the statute gave the majority of any craft or class the right to determine
who should be the representative of the entire group. The language of the
provision establishing this exclusive bargaining agent was broad enough to
cover all disputes under the Act. But there was other language which was
susceptible of the interpretation that with respect to a "dispute . . . arising
out of grievances or out of the interpretation of or application of agreements"
the particular employees involved should have the right to represent them-
selves or designate representatives different from the exclusive bargaining
agent. Legislative history shed little light. To 1r. Justice Rutledge the first
alternative would go so far ". . . to submerge wholly the individual and
minority interests, with all power to act concerning them, in the collective
interest and agency . . . [that] the conclusion that Congress intended such
consequences could be accepted only if it were clear that no other construction
would achieve the statutory aims."34  In the eyes of the dissenters, on the
other hand, ". . . to permit any member of the union to pursue his own
interest under a collective agreement undermines the very conception of a
collective agreement. It reintroduces destructive individualism in the relations
between the railroads and their workers which it was the very purpose of the
Railway Labor Act to eliminate." 5 Here then were competing considerations
of policy-concern lest the rights of the individual be squeezed out entirely by
powerful organizations as against concern that the stability and efficiency of
the collective bargaining machinery might be vitiated by too much individual-
ism: and the statute was equally generous in providing language in support of
each. Mr. Justice Rutledge's choice may have reflected a deeper sympathy for
the rights of the individual-the dissenters a firmer grasp of the realities of col-
lective bargaining.Y' But it would be idle to speak of either as judicial legislation.
34. Id. at 733-34.
35. Id. at 758.
36. In his opinion for the Court on petition for rehearing, Mr. Justice Rutledge
qualified the impact of the decision by indicating the circumstances under which authori-
zation for the union to proceed as representative of the employees might be implied
from their silent acquiescence.
It is interesting to compare the Burley case with Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331
U. S. 40 (1947), where Mr. Justice Rutledge again wrote for the Court, and Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson dissented. The question presented was whether the Selective
Service and Training Act protected a veteran for more than one year after restoration
to his former position from loss of seniority rights resulting from a change in collective
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III
In the field of federal regulatory statutes conferring broad authority
upon administrative agencies to regulate business enterprise, it is not always
easy to distinguish specific questions of statutory interpretation from the
general question of the reasonableness of the exercise of administrative discre-
tion. A good example of this is provided by Barrett Line, Inc. v. United
States 7 involving an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission denying
a permit for contract water carrier rights, where Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote
the opinion of the Court, with Chief Justice Stone, Mr. Justice Roberts,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting. The Commission
had denied the application for "grandfather rights" in chartering operations
on the ground that the applicant's operations during the statutory test period
had, so far as the record showed, been only in exempt commodities, with
respect to which a permit was unnecessary. The statute did not specifically
refer to the commodities carried in establishing the right to a "grandfather"
permit; it required only that the applicant be "in bona fide operation as a
contract carrier by water on January 1, 1940, [and since that date] over the
route or routes and between the ports with respect to which the application is
made .... "'I Mr. Justice Rutledge concluded that although such a limitation
might properly be implied with respect to other operations, it was not appropri-
ate in the case of chartering operations, which were separately defined by the
statute and in which the furnisher of the vessel had no particular interest
in the nature of the commodities being transported. The dissenters did
not deny that this was a permissible construction but took the position
that ". . . the construction of this provision involves considerations so
bound up with the technical subject matter that, even though the neutral
bargaining representatives and negotiation of a new collective agreement redefining
his seniority. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson expressed shock at the
apparent callousness with which the union had sacrificed the interest of the smaller group
to which the veteran belonged; but the Court held that whatever rights that group might
have against the Company or the Union in an appropriate proceeding on account of this
apparent injustice, the Selective Service Act did not give a veteran any better right to
assert them than a non-veteran. This seems to be a case where Mr. Justice Rutledge
subordinated his natural sympathies to what he understood to be the policy of the statute.
A more famous labor case involving statutory interpretation in which Mr. Justice
Rutledge participated %vas United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330
U. S. 258 (1947), where he agreed with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the Var Labor
Disputes Act did not modify the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act against the issuance
of injunctions in labor disputes. Unlike Mr. Justice Frankfurter, however, Mr. Justice
Rutledge rejected the contention that the injunction was entitled to obedience until set
aside on appeal, and therefore, he dissented from the Court's holding sustaining the
sentence for contempt. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Lodge 27 v. Toledo
P. & W. R. R., 321 U. S. 50 (1944), involving an interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in relation to the Railway Labor Act, where Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote the opinion
for a unanimous Court.
37. 326 U. S. 179 (1945).
38. 54 STAT. 941, 49 U.S.C. § 909(a) (1940).
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language of the statute permits, as a matter of English, the construction which
the Court now makes, the experience of the Commission should prevail."3
Respect for the administrative construction of a general statutory pro-
vision was a consideration to which Mr. Justice Rutledge was usually most
hospitable.4" With respect to this particular problem, however, he found
the Commission not only sharply divided but also inconsistent, thus de-
tracting from the persuasiveness of its position.41  The more fundamental
basis of his opinion was that the Commission's decision
to require the chartering carrier to prove specific instances of non-
exempt commodity carriage would molecularize, if not atomize, the
chartering business and threaten, if not accomplish, the destruc-
tion anticipated in the congressional debates. That result, or one
tending strongly toward it, as would such a construction, hardly
can be taken to be consistent with the declared national trans-
portation policy 'to provide for fair and impartial regulation of
all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, . . .
and preserve the inherent advantages of each' . . . Spasmodic
operation hardly would be regarded as an inherent advantage of
rail or perhaps of motor service in general. It is, or may be, the
most valuable inherent advantage of a contract water carrier.42
This may be taken as a hint of the suspicion, sometimes more emphatically
expressed in the opinions of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas,
that the Commission was not sufficiently sympathetic with the claims of
forms of transportation other than rail.
4 3
39. Barrett Line, Inc. v. United States, 326 U. S. 179, 202 (1945).
40. See his concurring opinion, in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined, in Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441, 449 (1947);
Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VANDERBILT
L. RaEv. 470. 477 (1950).
41. In a similar situation, presented by what he regarded as inconsistent decisions
of the Tax Court, Mr. Justice Rutledge said:
When this occurs, in my opinion a 'clearcut' question of law is presented,
rising above the rubric of 'expert administrative determination.' The
more apt characterization would be 'expert administrative fog.'
John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U. S. 521, 533 (1946) (concurring opinion).
42. Barrett Line, Inc. v. United States, 326 U. S. 179, 199 (1945).
43. Cf., e.g., the following cases: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326
U. S. 60, 74 (1945), sustaining an order of the Commission permitting trucking opera-
tions by a railroad, where Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in an opinion in which Justices
Black and Rutledge joined, said:
But the present decision allows the C6mmission to construe the statute
as if 'railroad convenience and necessity' rather than 'public convenience
and necessity' were the standard.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 330 U. S. 567 (1947), where the Court
held barge-rail rates established by the Commission invalid because they did not preserve
the inherent advantages of water transportation. [Mr. Justice Black wrote the opinion
of the Court, in which Mr. Justice Rutledge joined. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter
dissented.] Eastern-Central Motor Carriers Association v. United States, 321 U. S. 194
(1944), where Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote the opinion for the Court, holding invalid
as order of the Commission establishing minimum rates for motor carriers, while Chief
Justice Stone, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Reed dissented. But ef. McLean
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Another good example of Mr. Justice Rutledge's approach to problems of
regulatory statutes is to be found in United States v. American Union Trans-
port, Inc.,44 where again he wrote for the Court, while Mr. Justice Frank-
furter dissented on behalf of himself and Justices Black and Douglas-a
division which suggests the hazards of classifying justices in this, as in other
fields. The question was whether the provision of the Shipping Act giving
the Maritime Commission regulatory authority over "any person not included
in the term 'common carrier by water,' carrying on the business of forward-
ing . . . in connection with a common carrier by water"45 applied to inde-
pendent forwarders or was restricted to those ". . actually affiliated with
a common carrier in a corporate sense, or under the control of or pursuant to a
continuing contract with such a carrier. . . .11 Mr. Justice Rutledge, ex-
plaining the Court's conclusion that independent forwarders were covered,
said that it was ". . required not only by the broad and literal wording of
the definition but also to make effective the scheme of regulation the statute
established and by considerations of policy implicit in that scheme. . . .1"7 To
establish this general proposition, Mr. Justice Rutledge delineated the various
provisions of the statute which might well apply to the activities of independent
forwarders in order to protect shippers from the abuses at which the statute
was aimed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, suggested that as
a matter of literal reading, the phrase "in connection with a common carrier by
water" was practically superfluous if it did suggest something more than in-
dependent relationships with a carrier; and that as a matter of policy, "It is
a fair generalization that Congress has never supplanted the forces of compe-
tition by administrative regulation until a real evil had, in the opinion of Con-
gress, manifested the need for it."' '  Mr. Justice Frankfurter found no sug-
gestion of such a real evil in the legislative history. He also pointed out that
Congress had not regulated comparable land carrier forwarders and expressed
surprise that it should be ". . . argued that Congress thirty years ago asserted
control over such forwarders concerned with water-borne traffic and forbade
ordinary competition among them, though no basis in experience can account
for such action by Congress."49 This line of argument apparently provoked
Mr. Justice Rutledge to one of his few lectures on statutory interpretation:
Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944), where Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote
the opinion of the Court sustaining an order of the Commission authorizing a motor
carrier consolidation, while Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black dissented on the
ground that the Commission had not given sufficient weight to the policy of the anti-
trust laws, and Mr. Justice Murphy dissented without opinion.
44. 327 U. S. 437 (1946).
45. 39 STAT. 728 (1916), as amended, 40 STAT. 900 (1918), 46 U.S.C. 801 (1940).
46. United States v. American Union Transport, Inc., 327 U. S. 437, 441 (1946).
47. Id. at 443.
48. Id. at 459 (dissenting opinion).
49. Id. at 462.
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Statutes may be emasculated as readily and as much by unauthor-
ized restrictive reading as by one unduly expansive. And the wisdom
of the regulation of forwarders with corresponding restriction of
competitive freedom in the business is the concern of Congress,
not of this Court. We leave the statute as Congress enacted it.50
Mr. Justice Rutledge had, of course, frequent occasion to consider ques-
tions of statutory interpretation arising under the wartime price control laws.
In general he reacted with less than his usual hospitality for administrative
powers, toward attempts by the Price Administrator to assert powers not
clearly and explicitly conferred by statute.5 1 For example in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., ' 2 Mr. Justice Murphy wrote for the Court in upholding an order
directing restitution of overcharges in a suit by the Administrator for an in-
junction, while Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote a dissent for himself, Mr. Justice
Reed and Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Mr. Justice Murphy suggested that the
order could be supported either on the general powers of a court of equity, or
as "an order enforcing compliance" within the meaning of the provision
authorizing the Administrator to bring suit for such an order. Mr. Justice
Rutledge, on the other hand, observed: "It is not excessive to say that per-
haps no other legislation in our history has equalled the Price Control Acts in
the wealth of detail, precision and completeness of its jurisdictional, pro-
cedural, and remedial provisions. . . . This powerful battery of weapons does
not call for reinforcement with armor not provided in the Act."5  Mr. Justice
Rutledge had in the Yakus case 4 taken the position that the basic scheme of
enforcement, so far as criminal sanctions were concerned, was so strict as to
be a denial of due process as well as an invalid restriction of judicial power.
It is perhaps not surprising, in the light of this background, that he was
unwilling to add a jot or tittle to the enforcement machinery.
IV
There is one philosophical aspect of the problem of statutory interpreta-
tion upon which Mr. justice Rutledge did express himself with considerable
50. Id. at 457.
51. See, e.g., Thomas Paper Stock Co. v. Porter, 328 U. S. 50 (1946); Kraus &
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U. S. 614 (1946); Vinson v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 321 U. S. 489 (1944); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144 (1944);
but cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 (1944). Of
course, there is considerable danger of oversimplification in speaking of these cases
as if they involved only the powers of the Price Administrator. Several of them
involved also the action of other administrative agencies with somewhat conflicting
policies, while the Kraus case involved the interpretation of a price regulation, rather
than its validity. Nevertheless it seems fair to suggest that Mr. Justice Rutledge did
not regard the Price Administrator quite as benignly as he did the Wage and Hour
Administrator.
52. 328 U. S. 395 (1946).
53. Id. at 404-405 (dissenting opinion).
54. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 460 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
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fullness: the extent to which the courts should adhere to an earlier judicial
construction without re-examination of its merits, solely on the ground that
congressional silence or inaction indicates legislative acceptance of that con-
struction. His first discussion of this question is to be found in Cleveland v.
United States15 in which the Court sustained the application of the Mann Act
to the transportation by members of a Mormon sect, known as Fundamental-
ists, of women across state lines for the purpose of cohabitation as plural wives.
Mr. justice Douglas speaking for the Court rested the decision partly upon re-
examination of the language of the Act in relation to the social aspects of
polygamy, and partly upon respect for the holding in the Caminetti case'0
which has been in effect for almost thirty years.15 7  Mr. Justice
Rutledge concurred in the result, but he did so only upon the ground that
he considered the case indistinguishable from the Caminetti case which the
majority refused to overrule. But he also stated explicitly that, in his view,
the Caminetti case had wrongly construed the Mann Act and that ". . this
legislation and the problems presented by the cases arising under it are of
such a character as does not allow this Court properly to shift to Congress
the responsibility for perpetuating the Court's error." 8  In further ex-
planation of his general attitude on this subject, the Justice said:
There are vast differences between legislating by doing nothing
and legislating by positive enactment, both in the processes by which
the will of Congress is derived and stated and in the clarity and
certainty of the expression of its will. And there are many rea-
sons, other than to indicate approval of what the courts have done,
why Congress may fail to take affirmative action to repudiate
their misconstruction of its duly adopted laws. Among them may
be the sheer pressure of other and more important business. . . . At
times political considerations may work to forbid taking corrective
action. And in such cases, as well as others, there may be a strong
and proper tendency to trust to the courts to correct their own
errors, . . . as they ought to do when experience has confirmed or
demonstrated the error's existence. 59
Another example of the application of this philosophy is to be found in
United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 60 in which the Court was called upon to
reconsider its holding in the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern R. R. case that the
prohibition of the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act, for-
bidding a railroad from transporting, except for its own use, commodities
which it owns or in which it has an interest, did not necessarily apply to trans-
porting commodities of a corporation whose stock was wholly owned by a
55. 329 U. S. 14, 21 (1946) (concurring opinion).
56. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917).
57. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 18 (1946).
58. Id. at 22.
59. Id. at 22-23.
60. 333 U. S. 771 (1948).
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holding company which also owned all the stock of the railroad. Mr. Justice
Jackson, writing for the majority, rested the Court's refusal to overrule the
Elghi case on the ground that Congress had failed to do so after the decision
had been specifically called to its attention. In support of this conclusion he
pointed out that the bill which became the Transportation Act of 1940, as
originally introduced, contained language calculated to overrule the Elgin case
and that the committee considering the bill had eliminated this language and
reported a bill retaining the original language of the commodities clause, be-
cause, as the Report stated: "'The rewritten commodities clause was con-
sidered far too drastic and the subcommittee early decided against any change
therein.' '61 This was on its face pretty strong evidence of congressional
acquiescence, but Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting on behalf of himself and
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, went behind the Committee Report to
adduce evidence that the reason why the bill was considered too drastic in its
original form was that it would apply to all types of carriers except air carriers
and also, in conjunction with other proposed legislation, would have prohibited
the transportation of commodities for anyone who owned as much as ten per
cent of the stock of the carrier. Furthermore, he found evidence in the hear-
ings that some of the Senators taking an active interest in the legislation an-
ticipated that the Court would itself disavow the rule of the Elgin case the next
time the problem was presented to it. Mr. Justice Rutledge concluded his
discussion of this phase of the case by saying:
The host of reasons which may have induced the various members
of the committee to forego the extremely controversial and drastic
extensions forbids any inference that the committee action was
equivalent of approval of the Elgin case by the entire Congress. In
fact, the difficulty of interpreting the views of even one legislator
without taking account of all he has had to say . . . should serve as
a warning that the will of Congress seldom is to be determined from
its wholly negative actions subsequent to the enactment of the statute
construed. In this case the rejection of the proposed amendment is
not more, indeed I think it is less, indicative of congressional acquies-
cence than complete inactivity would have been. Even if there may be
cases where the 'silence of Congress' may have some weight, that
ambiguous doctrine does not require or support the result which
the Court reaches today.6 2
It will be noted that in neither of the two opinions did Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge say that the refusal of Congress to take countervailing legislative action
should never be regarded as the decisive factor against the overruling by the
Court itself of a previous decision. It is quite clear, however, that he.adhered
to the principle that the Court should feel free to correct its own errors so long
as it was dealing with the same statutory language, irrespective of what had
61. Id. at 777.
62. Id. at 792 (dissenting opinion).
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transpired in intervening Congresses. For example, he joined in the judgment
of the Court in the Girouard case,63 which overruled the prior holdings that an
alien who refused to bear arms was not entitled to citizenship, despite the sub-
sequent re-enactment of the same statutory language upon which those holdings
were based. Mr. Justice Rutledge did not write a separate opinion, but he was
apparently unmoved by the powerful dissent in which Chief Justice Stone said:
It is the responsibility of Congress, in reenacting a statute, to make
known its purpose in a controversial matter of interpretation of its
former language, at least when the matter has, for over a decade, been
persistently brought to its attention. In the light of this legislative
history, it is abundantly clear that Congress has performed that duty.
In any case it is not lightly to be implied that Congress has failed to
perform it and has delegated to this Court the responsibility of giving
new content to language deliberately readopted after this Court
has construed it. For us to make such an assumption is to dis-
courage, if not to deny, legislative responsibility.6
Nevertheless, it will be recalled that in the Halliburton case,6 2\r. Justice
Rutledge joined with the majority in applying the rule of the Belo case, even
though he was convinced that it embodied an erroneous construction of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. There, however, he placed his concurrence upon
the ground that "the Belo case has been relied upon by the parties to this
clause, and no doubt also by others, in making their arrangements."66  Such
considerations of individual injustice were more persuasive to Mr. Justice
Rutledge than abstractions with respect to the relative spheres of legislative
and judicial responsibility.
V
On the basis of the foregoing examples, which are offered as typical, a
few generalizations may be suggested with respect to Mr. Justice Rutledge's
attitude toward problems of statutory construction. On the whole the Justice
did not seem particularly inhibited by the concern expressed in the observation
of Judge Learned Hand:
It is always a dangerous business to fill in the text of a statute
from its purposes, and, although it is a duty often unavoidable,
it is utterly unwarranted unless the omission from, or corruption
of, the text is plain.67
63. Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 (1946).
64. id. at 76 (dissenting opinion).
65. See text at note 22 supra.
66. 331 U. S. 17, 26 (1947) (concurring opinion).
67. Harris v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Nor did he seem to set much store by the precept of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
For judicial construction to stick close to what the legislation says
and not draw prodigally upon unformulated purposes or directions
makes for careful draftsmanship and for legislative responsibility.68
Rather he seemed to feel that it was his responsibility as a judge to do the very
best he could with the statute before him--a responsibility that would be better
discharged by painstaking study of the entire framework of a statute and its
legislative development, than by unquestioning reliance upon the exact phrase-
ology of the immediately pertinent provisions. This does not mean, however,
that he felt free to read his own economic or social predilections into a statute,
irrespective of legislative policies. So far as one can tell from examining the
external evidence, he sought earnestly for every flicker of light which might
illuminate the "legislative intent" or "what Congress had in mind." When
there were conflicting indications, his guiding principle seemed to be that it
was the judge's responsibility to effectuate the primary objectives of the
statute to the fullest extent possible within the general framework provided.
This emphasis may, at times, have left him open to the criticism of attaching
too little significance to qualifying considerations which might also be fairly
regarded as part of the legislative policy. But to such a criticism the Justice
might have answered that in the hurly-burly of the legislative process, it is with
respect to the primary objectives of legislation that the people's representatives
make the voting record upon which they purport to stand or fall; and that
the judiciary best serves the democratic process when it does its best to
translate those professed objectives into concrete realities.
68. Frankfurter, Foreword, SYiosIUi ON STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION, 3 VANDER-
DiLT L. REv. 365 (1950).
